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1Safeguarding Judicial Integrity by Making the
Executive Branch’s Unfettered Amicus
Gateway Transparent: An Argument for the
Supreme Court to Exercise its Inherent
Authority to Make Public the President’s Tax
and Investment Records
JOSHUAKASTENBERG1
When the executive branch submits an amicus brief to the federal
appellate courts, and most importantly, to the Supreme Court, it has the
strength of being considered under a standard of “the best interest of the
United States.” This enables a considerable advantage, but without the
safeguards commensurate for ensuring that the standard is maintained.
Other amicus actors must file a corporate interest statement of other type of
disclosure that the Solicitor General is exempt from doing. The history of
the Solicitor General should also provide skepticism that the federal courts
are immune from being used for nefarious reasons. This article argues that
a required public disclosure of presidential financial assets is needed to
ensure that judicial integrity and fairness in the appellate process are
safeguarded. The Court is able to quickly, through its rule-making
authority, mandate such a safeguard.
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Throughout the 2016 Presidential Campaign, which, for the purposes
of this article, began after the 2013 inauguration, candidate Donald Trump
promised that he would release his 2005 through 2016 federal tax returns.2
Although Justice Antonin Scalia once observed campaign promises as “the
least binding form of human commitment,” the fact remains that President
Trump promised to provide his tax records to the public as matter of trust
and transparency.3 Since he assumed the presidency, commentators, politi-
cians, and legal scholars have openly questioned his and his immediate
family’s adherence to governmental ethics, as well as the commitment of
his cabinet members and key advisors.4 This article, while accepting the
unfortunate reality of Justice Scalia’s observation on the ephemeral nature
of political promises, is not premised on a theory of enforceability of such
promises in the federal courts. Rather, Mr. Trump’s campaign and his ensu-
ing presidency has brought to light the potential for the federal courts, and
in particular the Supreme Court, to be used to advance the financial inter-
ests of a president, a president’s family, cabinet heads, key advisors, and/or
the business and investment partners of such persons through the Office of
the Solicitor General and certain other federal counsel. The current admin-
istration’s lack of transparency is evident in the solicitor general’s recent
action in which the United States is a party. In a pending appeal titled Mur-
phy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, the solicitor general decided to reverse its ar-
guments from a previous filing without, apparently, a formal “confession of
error.”5 The present solicitor general has asserted that the prior administra-
1. Joshua Kastenberg is a professor at the University of New Mexico School of
Law. Prior to joining the law faculty there, he served for over twenty years in the United
States Air Force including for the last six as a military trial judge. Professor Kastenberg has
written on national security, military law, and judicial ethics as his focus. He dedicates this
article to his daughter Elinor.
2. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Baumgaertner, As Tax Day Approach-
es, Protesters Demand to See Trump’s Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2017; Jill Disis, All the
things Donald Trump has said about releasing his tax returns, CNN MONEY (Apr. 17, 2017
9:49 PM ET) http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/17/news/donald-trump-tax-returns/
[https://perma.cc/Z42S-KG4R].
3. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002); See, e.g., Alan
Rappeport, Trump’s Unreleased Taxes Threaten Another Campaign Promise, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2017.
4. Editorial Board, Mr. Trump Plays by His Own Rules (or No Rules), N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2017; Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Trump Couple, Now White House Employees,
Can’t Escape Conflict Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017.
5. Amy Howe, Murphy Oil’s Law: Solicitor General’s Office Reverses Course in
Arbitration Cases, Supports Employers, (June 19, 2017, 7:12 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/murphy-oils-law-solicitor-generals-office-reverses-
course-arbitration-cases-supports-employers/ [https://perma.cc/6DTX-PUR4].
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tion’s position that the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) decision
that individual arbitration clauses could not be expanded to vitiate collec-
tive bargaining rights was wrong.6 In essence, the solicitor general went
from siding with a union to siding with a publicly traded corporation that
possesses a political action committee that has contributed to various Re-
publican political candidacies.7 The solicitor general’s brief has an amicus
component to it in that they have sided with two other corporations in the
consolidated appeal.8
Mirroring the solicitor general’s conduct in Murphy Oil, the Justice
Department recently filed an amicus brief in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in opposition to the government’s previous
position that Title VII protects gays and lesbians from workplace discrimi-
nation.9 Now, the Justice Department —under the direction of the attorney
general— is arguing in an amicus brief that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission’s determination that an employee was wrongfully ter-
minated from a private employer on the basis of discrimination was in er-
ror, and therefore, federal workplace protections do not apply to sexual
orientation or identification.10
Because the ability to influence the federal appellate courts through
the amicus process is not an inherently or even constitutionally-implied
presidential power, the Court should exercise its inherent authority and im-
6. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in
Nos 16-285 and 16-300 and Supporting Respondents in No 3-16, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, –
––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017) (Nos. 16-285, 16-300, 16-307), 2017 WL 2665007. But
see Reply Brief for Petitioner, Murphy Oil USA, INC. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir.
2015) (No. 16-307), 2016 WL 7030498.
7. See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013
(5th Cir. 2015); Murphy Oil Corp., Investor Overview,
http://ir.murphyoilcorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61237&p=irol-irhome
[https://perma.cc/UHT7-L3X3]. According to the Federal Election Committee, Murphy Oil
possesses a political action campaign which contributed monies during the 2016 election
cycle by a division of 95% to Republican candidates. See Murphy Oil Corporation Political
Action Committee: Financial Summary, (2015-2016), FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00145722/?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/PVJ4-
GNH2].
8. See, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in Nos.
16-285 and 16-300 and supporting respondents in No. 16-307, Epic Sys. Corp., v. Lewis,
No. 16-285 (June 16, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/revised_16-285_16-300_tsac_16-307_bsac_USA.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Justice Department Says Rights Laws do not Protect
Gays, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017; Fred Barbash, Trump Administration Intervening in Major
LGBT Case, Says Job Bias Law Does Not Cover Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST, July 27,
2017. The decision, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) was issued on
April 18, 2017, and the Justice Department’s amicus brief regards an en banc rehearing
scheduled for September 26, 2017. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017).
10. Feuer, supra note 9.
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pose a rule set requiring the President, his immediate family, cabinet mem-
bers, and key advisors to open their tax and investment records to the fullest
public scrutiny, if the executive branch desires its amicus practice to con-
tinue. This proposed rule is not simply targeted at the current administra-
tion. Any rule set created to constrain the executive branch’s influence in
shaping federal judicial appellate decisions through the amicus process will
apply to all future Presidents, presidential families, cabinet officers, and key
advisors, regardless of their wealth or party affiliation. This proposed rule
set does not intrude on the separation of powers and would be an evolution-
ary and progressive step in a process which began as early as the nation’s
founding. In one regard, this proposed rule set is premised on Justice Samu-
el Freeman Miller’s observation that because the judiciary is “the feeblest
branch or department of the government,” it has “to rely on the confidence
and respect of the public for their weight and influence in the govern-
ment.”11 It is noteworthy that according to a 2016 Gallup Poll, the public’s
confidence in the federal judiciary hovers at an abysmal 36%, ranking it far
lower than the military, churches, and police.12
Notwithstanding representation of the executive branch when the
United States is a named party, the solicitor general is uniquely situated to
influence the Court in three fundamental ways when the United States is not
a party to an appeal. The solicitor general can provide his or her opinion to
the Court on the importance of granting or denying certiorari to a cause
under consideration. This influence can be subdivided into two classes:
invited petition stage amicus briefs and uninvited petition stage amicus
briefs. The solicitor general also has the Court’s permission to provide an
amicus argument to the Court and lower federal courts of appeal without
having to gain the agreement of the named parties, or motion the various
courts to do so.13 Other government counsel may provide the lower courts
11. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THREE
LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 25
(1880). Miller was by no means the only justice to articulate such concerns. In 1908, George
Shiras, a retired justice penned to Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller that given the social
upheaval of that time, “it is growing more and more apparent that the safety and welfare of
the country depend largely on the integrity and fairness of the courts.” Letter from Shiras to
Fuller (1908) (on file with the Melville Fuller Papers, Library of Congress box 9).
12. Jim Norman, Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Stays Low, GALLUP NEWS
(June 13, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/192581/americans-confidence-institutions-
stays-low.aspx [https://perma.cc/J6W7-9DLT].
13. FED. R. APP. P. 29(2); see also SUP. CT. R. 37.4.
No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the
brief is presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General;
on behalf of any agency of the United States allowed by law to appear
before this Court when submitted by the agency’s authorized legal repre-
sentative; on behalf of a State, Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession
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of appeal amicus briefs without seeking approval or having to motion the
appellate court, and this article’s premise, though focused on the solicitor
general, also applies to these federal attorneys. This unique amicus entry
into the Court and lower federal appellate courts enables the solicitor gen-
eral to pursue executive branch policy regardless of whether his or her es-
pousal of the executive branch’s position fits within a generic, yet mallea-
ble, best interests of the United States standard.14 Decisions on whether to
file amicus briefs to the Court are usually governed by “the best interest of
the United States.”15 There is also a tangential means for the solicitor gen-
eral to influence a future appeal. Congress granted to the Justice Depart-
ment a right of intervention in federal trials where the constitutionality of a
statute or significant government interest is challenged.16 In theory, a lim-
ited governmental intervention at the district level would preserve an issue
for appeal, and therefore, present an amicus filing opportunity.
In the majority of the solicitor general’s amicus briefs, the best inter-
ests of the United States standard is implied rather than directly noted. In
this light, it is important to recognize that the Court’s use of solicitor gen-
eral’s amicus briefs has steadily risen since World War II, and that the party
when submitted by its Attorney General; or on behalf of a city, county,
town, or similar entity when submitted by its authorized law officer.
SUP. CT. R. 37.4; See also, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Solicitor General’s Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324-1325
(2010).
14. See, e.g., Solicitor General Oversight: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary U.S. S., One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Sess., on Examining the Operation and
Activities of the Office of the Solicitor General of the Dep’t of Justice, 104th Cong. 4 (1997)
(statement of Drew Days); Reauthorization of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Office for U.S.
Attorneys, Civil Division, Env’t and Nat. Resources Div., Exec. Office for U.S. Trustees, and
Office of the Solicitor General: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Sess., 109th
Cong. 61-62 (2006) (statement of Paul D. Clement); See also, e.g., Drew Days III, The Solic-
itor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. REV. 73, 78 (1996); Erwin Griswold,
Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of the United States Before the
Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 536 (1969).
15. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, FY 2017 Performance Budget, 4
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/file/820906/download [https://perma.cc/PG4C-RW3V].
The number of cases in which the Solicitor General petitions the Su-
preme Court for review, acquiesces in a petition for a writ of certiorari
filed by an adverse party, or participates as an intervener or as amicus
curiae is governed exclusively by the Solicitor General’s determination
that it is in the best interest of the United States to take such action.
Id. However, it must be noted that some former Deputy Solicitors General have argued that
the office serves the interests of the President. See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, Past, Pre-
sent Solicitors General Face the Ultimate Question: Who is the Client?, A.B.A. J., 89-Oct.
2003, at 83.
16. See 28 U.S.C. 2403 (2012); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Jones & Lamson
Mach. Co., 854 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1988).
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supported by the solicitor general’s amicus brief has prevailed in over 80%
of appeals.17 One can perhaps assume that because a solicitor general’s
amicus position is based on the above-noted standard, the brief carries a
moral weight not present in all other amici. The solicitor general’s success
can be better understood by recognizing that while the amicus curiae brief
was originally designed as a means for bringing dispassionate advice to
appellate judges, the modern amicus brief is often nothing more than advo-
cacy by an interested non-party.18 In 1997, in Ryan v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Judge Posner, on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, noted “[t]he vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies
of litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants' briefs, in ef-
fect merely extending the length of the litigant's brief.” 19 Posner labeled the
growing judicial acceptance of amicus briefs which sided with a litigating
party, “an abuse” and recommended restrictions on the practice.20
There are two paths for the Court to promulgate greater transparency
rules. The first is by the Court speedily issuing a new rule as part of the
Supreme Court Rules of Practice (SCR). This is not a wholly novel concept.
Within its own rules the Court dictates requirements for admission of coun-
sel21 as well as rules to initiate disbarment proceedings.22 The second means
would be through the lengthier process of modifying the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (FRAP). The FRAP apply to the lower federal appel-
late courts and not the Court itself.23 For reasons noted below, both paths
should be undertaken. The Court should enact a rule for itself and then use
the rule as a “test bed” to prove to Congress the necessity, as well as a lack
17. See, e.g., Joseph Kearney & Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV 743, 760 (2000) (explaining the increasing
use of amicus briefs); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807,
810-811, 825-26 (2004); See also Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound:
Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1183
(2011); REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 27 (1992)
(explaining the solicitor general’s success rates in amicus practice). But see, John Harring-
ton, Note, Amici Curiae in the Federal Courts of Appeal: How Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 667, 676-677 (2005). It should be noted that at least one study has conclud-
ed that while amicus briefs have influenced the Supreme Court, the influence of amicus
briefs on the appellate courts is less certain. Id. at 675.
18. See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advo-
cacy, 72 YALE L. J. 694, 694-95 (1963).
19. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.
1997).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 5 (admission to the bar); SUP. CT. R. 6 (permitting motion
for Pro Hac Vice).
22. SUP. CT. R. 8.
23. FED. R. APP. P. 1.
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of harm to the political branches, for an additional rule to the FRAP requir-
ing greater transparency for the executive branch’s amicus filings.
This article is constructed in three sections, with the caveat that it is
focused on the Court’s duties to protect the integrity of the federal judiciary
rather than simply ensuring fairness to appellate litigants. To be sure, appel-
late litigants can use the same arguments contained in this article to motion
the courts of appeal and the Court to provide access to the financial records
of the key government officers noted above in order to counter the solicitor
general’s amicus arguments in an effort to provide fairness, in both fact and
appearance, to the appellate litigation. And, fairness to the parties will also
bolster confidence in the judiciary’s impartiality. But, in an era of lessening
confidence in the judiciary, a lack of transparency in the presidency, and
presidential attacks on judges, there is a need for the Court to protect the
judiciary’s independence from the executive branch to the fullest degree
that the Constitution expects of it. Thus, the transparency rule proposed
herein is to inform the executive branch that in order to have the federal
courts consider its amicus briefs, the tax and investment records of the Pres-
ident, his family, and key advisors and officers must be opened to the pub-
lic rather than simply be made available to the named parties in an appeal.
The first section analyzes the inherent rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court, as well as the Court’s obligation to preserve the judicial
branch’s integrity. While Congress has statutorily defined the duties and
authority of the solicitor general, the Court possesses the ability to create
“rules of entry” for the solicitor general and other government attorneys,
which do not impede or contradict the statutes defining the solicitor gen-
eral’s duties or those of agency counsel. The basic historic underpinnings of
amicus practice are also analyzed for guidance into how a transparency rule
can be viewed as a legitimate means for the judiciary to be insulated against
the appearance of its subordination to the executive branch. The second
section details the unique role and influence that the solicitor general pos-
sesses in judicial decision making, including cases where the United States
is not a named party. It is partly because of the solicitor general’s level of
influence that the Court should exercise its discretionary authority to con-
fine the executive branch to strict ethical standards in amicus practice
through the imposition of a transparency rule. Although opponents of such
a rule might argue that creating a fixed and defined best interest of the
United States standard could alleviate the appearance of the judiciary being
used for nefarious purposes, and thereby depoliticize the solicitor general’s
amicus decisional processes, this step would still leave the public and the
judiciary being asked to trust the executive branch with no evidence to sup-
port such trust. For this reason, this article concludes with an observation
that the less-publicly transparent a presidential administration is, the more
the Court has a duty to limit the influence of the executive branch to those
appeals in which the United States is a named party.
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I: SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AND RULEMAKINGAUTHORITY
In Article III, the United States Constitution explicitly establishes the
Supreme Court and implicitly protects the independence of the Court as
well as the lesser federal courts that are created by Congress.24 The Consti-
tution also delineates a vast expanse of judicial power over, inter alia, the
“laws of the United States” and “controversies to which the United States
shall be a party.”25 When the framers drafted Article III, there was no inten-
tion that the Court’s authority would be wholly confined to a reactive role.26
Indeed, there was a pre-constitutional desire for judicial independence as
24. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1954) (in which
Justice Black, in authoring the decision, noted “[t]he provisions of Article III were designed
to give judges maximum freedom from the possible coercion or influence by the executive
or legislative branches of the Government.”). U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 reads,
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts,
shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times,
receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Toth did not arise as a challenge to judicial integrity. Rather, it
arose from an appeal against the Department of Air Force’s assertion of court-martial juris-
diction over a discharged service member. Toth, 350 U.S. at 16.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 reads,
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting am-
bassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between
a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different
states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
states, citizens or subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26. See, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS AND ERIC MCKITTRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM:
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 62-64 (1993). In this instance, the authority
and wisdom of the Court to issue a transparency rule to the solicitor general may be derived
from THE FEDERALISTNO. 78 which reads, in pertinent part:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Consti-
tution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors,
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunc-
tures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliber-
ate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor par-
ty in the community.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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evidenced in various colonial grievances against judges in that they were
too dependent on the Crown for their livelihood.27
The concept of a judiciary’s inherent rule-making authority not only
predates the Constitution, but it is part and parcel of the judiciary guarding
its independence.28 There is nothing in the Constitution’s text that prohibits
the federal courts from enforcing their authority through the contempt pow-
er. In Anderson v. Dunn, the Court in 1821 held that the judicial branch’s
contempt power is both statutory and implied as a means for vindicating
offenses against the judiciary’s authority.29 In 1988, Judge Elbert Parr Tut-
tle, one of the noted pro-civil rights judicial scholars of the 1950s and
1960s, observed that historically, the contempt authority enabled a judge to
“make, enforce, and interpret the law simultaneously.”30 Thus, an attorney
who willfully disregards judicial rules, such as discovery orders, faces vari-
ous sanction possibilities. Although the contempt authority is only one of
many means for assessing the Court’s power to enact a transparency rule, it
may be the best starting point since the power exists to ensure the federal
judiciary’s integrity. Today, the Court possesses other rule-making authori-
ties over civil procedure, evidence, and appellate procedure, and is influen-
tial over the shaping and maintenance of legal ethics. In 1983, the Court, in
United States v. Hasting, recognized that federal courts possessed “supervi-
sory powers” to formulate procedural rules not required by the Constitution
or Congress as a means to preserve judicial integrity.”31 Numerous com-
mentators have noted that the Court, as part of its status as an independent
coordinate branch of government, possesses the authority to internally regu-
late itself, the federal judiciary as a whole, its participants, and the lawyers
and parties who practice before it.32
27. Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1104, 1152-53 (1976).
28. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1958) (noting a
concurrent authority to make judicial rules with the legislatures).
29. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227-28 (1821). Anderson arose as a challenge
to the legislative branch’s authority to adjudge contempt, but the Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Johnson, must have believed it necessary to assert a commensurate basis
for a judicial contempt authority. Id.
30. Elbert Parr Tuttle & Dean W. Russell, Preserving Judicial Integrity: Some
Comments on the Role of the Judiciary Under the “Blending of Powers,” 37 EMORY L.J.
587, 591 (1988).
31. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
32. See, Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1050-1158 (1982) (analyzing judicial rule-making authority); PETER GRAHAM FISH,
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 228-268 (1973) (describing the role of
the Judicial Conference setting standards of ethics, procedural rules, and aspects of judicial
efficiency).
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A. SUPREME COURT’S AUTHORITY TO MAINTAIN JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
As a general proposition, federal courts possess the authority to protect
proceedings and judgments in the discharge of their judicial duties by con-
straining attorney conduct. It is important to understand that the Court po-
lices the legal profession in a number of different ways that are applicable
to this article’s premise. The justices possess rule-making authority to re-
quire the parties to adhere to ethical standards of litigation. The Court has
determined that bar applicants’ political affiliations, alone, may not be a
basis for denial into the practice of law.33 The Court has also reviewed
whether disbarment in the state courts requires disbarment in the federal
courts.34 In In re Ruffalo, the Court held, “admission to practice before a
federal court is derivative from membership in a state bar, disbarment by
the State does not result in automatic disbarment by the federal court.
Though a state’s act of disbarment is entitled to respect, it is not conclusive-
ly binding on the federal courts.”35 Moreover, the Court possesses contempt
authority. In 1906, in United States v. Shipp, the Court unanimously held
that it not only possessed the authority to determine the extent of its own
jurisdiction to issue orders against a state activity, but it also determined
that it possessed jurisdiction to hold individuals in contempt.36 Although in
33. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957); See
also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
34. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957). Theard arose from a Louisiana
disbarment action in which a state hospital had determined he was “suffering under an ex-
ceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity.” Id. at 279. This determina-
tion occurred in 1935, but, for reasons that are absent from the Court’s analysis, Louisiana
based its disbarment of Theard in 1953 on the psychiatric determination almost two decades
earlier. Theard had also committed a forgery in 1935. The Court, in a decision authored by
Justice Felix Frankfurter held, “We do not think that ‘the principles of right and justice’
require a federal court to enforce disbarment of a man eighteen years after he had uttered a
forgery when concededly he ‘was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condi-
tion, some degree of insanity’.” Id. at 282.
35. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 548 (1968).
36. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). In February 1906, a Tennessee
state criminal trial found “Johnson, a colored man,” guilty of “rape upon a white woman”
and sentenced him to death. Id. at 571. Johnson’s attorneys appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus. Although the Court of
Appeals denied a writ, Justice Harlan ordered the state to “stay” Johnson’s execution until
the Court could determine the merits of the habeas appeal. Id. at 571. Shortly after Harlan’s
order, a sheriff colluded with white citizens to enable a mob to murder Johnson. Id. at 571-
72. In response, the justices unanimously agreed to hold a contempt trial against the sheriff,
the jailer, and several other officials including the state trial judge. Id. at 572. These men
appealed against the Court’s assertion of its contempt jurisdiction. Shipp, 203 U.S. at 572-
73. The Court resoundingly determined that it possessed jurisdiction to hold persons in con-
tempt regarding any issue that it possessed jurisdiction over, and since the Court determined
its own jurisdiction, the acts or omissions of the persons responsible for Johnson’s murder
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Shipp, the Court appeared to imply that it possessed unlimited contempt
authority, in Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., the justices
mandated ethical standards for the prosecution of contempt in the United
States district courts by prohibiting attorneys with an interest in the out-
come of the contempt proceedings from serving as court-appointed prose-
cutors.37
Ensuring that attorneys understand their ethical duty to the federal
courts is a more than a century old aspect of judicial governance. In Bradley
v Fisher, the Court articulated that although attorneys have a duty to their
respective clients, they are also required to “be obedient” to the Constitu-
tion and “maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judi-
cial officers.”38 In essence, attorneys who practice before the federal courts
not only have a responsibility to have candor in all matters before the court,
but they also have a responsibility to conform their practice to the court’s
rules.39 Conformance to judicially created rules are not only related to the
requirement to adhere to various ethics canons. The courts have the ability
to sanction violations of both the canons and rules to enforce the integrity
of the judicial process. On this point, the Court has determined that various
sanctions contained within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facially
comport with due process as a matter of preserving judicial power, and
therefore a court’s integrity, during civil trials.40 Moreover, the procedural
rules are colorblind in that the executive branch is not immune from the
same possible sanctions as private litigants.41
The Court has further determined that Article III of the Constitution
guarantees to litigants the right to have claims decided before judges who
are free from the potential domination of the other branches of govern-
ment.42 On rare occasions, this principle has placed the Court in an awk-
ward position of de facto regulating a federal agency. In 1980, United
States v. Will determined that although a challenged compensation scheme
could be found contemptuous. Id. at 572-575. When read to its logical extent, one could find
that the Court implied that it possessed almost unlimited contempt authority.
37. See Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
38. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
39. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 430 (1988) (rule requir-
ing appellate counsel for indigent client to inform court of appeals that appeal is frivolous);
Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (court within sound
discretion to reprimand attorney who disparaged opposing counsel in ad hominem attacks);
Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1998) (Federal district courts are
bound by the disciplinary rules they implement when proceeding against attorneys for viola-
tion of ethical standards).
40. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (permitting sanctions against government attorneys for
failing to comply with the basic pleading requirements in federal civil trials).
42. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
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for federal employees would, by its very nature, effect the judiciary – and
particularly so in this appeal since the appellants were a class of federal
judges from the Northern District of Illinois – a rule of necessity could be
constitutionally invoked for judges, including the Court, to determine the
appeal in the federal courts.43 The compensation scheme existed as a matter
of statute, but Congress placed discretion in the executive branch to estab-
lish administrative commissions to determine federal pay.44 After determin-
ing that necessity – the absence of any viable judicial alternative – required
the Court to consider the appeal. The Court then determined that both the
legislative and executive branches had violated the constitutional prohibi-
tion against reducing judicial salaries.45 The Supreme Court case, Will,
serves as an important demarcation for the Court to enact rules to protect
judicial integrity in two basic areas.
First, in matters involving judicial integrity, the Court implied that the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches could not
be used as a means for preventing the Court to ensure that it operated with
the full constitutional authority demanded of it. Commensurately, the Court
could command an executive branch agency to cease the operation of a
government program that was harmful to the judiciary.
Secondly, the justices recognized that the doctrine of necessity, while
ancient in scope, remained a viable means to ensure the Court could not be
cabined from limiting the influence of either political branch on it. Indeed,
six years after the Court issued Will, it reaffirmed the principles articulated
in that decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.46
Moreover, in Schor, the Court also noted that there are no “formalistic
and unbending rules” to confront threats to the judicial branch’s integrity.47
Taken together, Will and Schor provide evidence that the proposed trans-
parency rule can overcome an argument that the separation of powers
would be undermined by such a rule.
The classic means by which the Court maintains its own integrity is in
its general oversight of the legal profession. As early as 1824, the Court
determined that district court judges possessed the authority to control ad-
mission to practice and to discipline the attorneys who appeared in the low-
er federal courts.48 Commensurately, the Court has, over time, limited the
power of the lower courts in a manner that shapes the universality of stand-
ards of legal practice. In Frazier v. Heebe, the Court held that the district
courts possess a limited authority to issue rules regulating the admission to
43. Id. at 212-213.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 229-230.
46. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 US 833 (1986).
47. Id. at 851.
48. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529 (1824).
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practice law within the district.49 In this decision, an attorney challenged the
United States District Court for the District of Louisiana’s rule that all at-
torneys seeking admission to practice before the court either reside or main-
tain an office in that state. A Mississippi-based attorney who had been ad-
mitted to the Louisiana State Bar challenged the rule, and the Court, in a
decision authored by Justice Brennan, held that the district court had arbi-
trarily exceeded its authority in doing so.50 The Court recognized that a
district court possessed the discretion to adopt local rules “that are neces-
sary to the conduct of its business,” but the justices had the duty to protect
the integrity of the judicial system against arbitrary rules.51
Following the Civil War, the Court determined that an attorney’s loy-
alty to the Confederacy could not be used to prevent him from practicing
before the federal courts as an unconstitutional bill of attainder.52 Despite
this decision, the basic premise of using a person’s gender, religious beliefs,
or political affiliations as a prohibition from entering the Bar has a mixed
history.53 As early as 1931 the Court expressly determined that it possessed
the power to inquire into the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice be-
fore it.54 In In re Snyder, the Court, in reversing the disbarment of a North
Dakota attorney, reaffirmed that it possessed supervisory authority over
attorneys admitted to practice in the federal courts.55 This appeal arose from
an attorney’s abrupt response to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s denial of his claim for payments arising from the defense of an indi-
gent defendant.56
In addition to the basic powers of contempt, admission, and disbar-
ment, the Court has also regulated the practice of the legal profession out-
side of the federal courts. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court struck
49. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987).
50. Id. The Court recognized that the district court had arrived at its holding after
consideration of testimonial evidence which indicated that “out of state” attorneys had
slowed the business of the district court due to longer travel times for emergency or un-
scheduled hearings. Id.; See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (the
Court determined that a state bar could prohibit direct advertising to potential clients because
of the heightened possibility of fraud).
51. Frazier, 482 U.S. 645.
52. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
53. See, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971) (holding that a person’s affiliation with a
political organization is not enough to preclude entry into the bar); In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561 (1945) (upholding Illinois’s discrimination against conscientious objectors from enter-
ing the bar as a state prerogative); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding Illi-
nois’s denial of entry into the bar of women, but reversed by implication in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
54. In re Baff, 1931 LEXIS 909 (1931).
55. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
56. Id. at 643.
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down Arizona’s ban on attorney advertising.57 Five years after Bates, the
Court determined that an attorney could advertise his admission to the Su-
preme Court, even though Justice Lewis Powell, who authored the decision,
opined that the attorney’s emphasis on admission to practice before the
nation’s highest court was “in bad taste,” because there is no testable re-
quirement for admission to the Supreme Court.58 Although the Court
evolved toward a greater application of free speech to attorney advertising,
it also accepted that attorney speech outside of the courtroom can be con-
strained by the Rules of Ethics. For instance, in Gentile v. State Bar of Ne-
vada, it determined that reasonable restraints against public speech calcu-
lated or likely to effect a pending litigation were constitutional.59
Finally, the Court has an interest in the shaping of judicial ethics in re-
gard to conflicts of interest. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., the
Court determined that a state supreme court justice could not fulfill his duty
of judicial impartiality in adjudicating an appeal involving a party who had
privately and independently raised thousands of dollars for the state jus-
tice’s election.60 Although the Court does not appear to have issued a deci-
sion limiting amicus briefs based on the monetary interests of corporate
parties, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a decision authored by
then Judge Alito observed that there is no bar against erstwhile amici with
pecuniary interests from filing briefs to an appellate court.61 In other words,
friend of the court does not equate to disinterested party, and judicial
recusal coupled with the disclosure requirement is a safeguard for ensuring
57. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (the Court did not rule that
attorney advertising could not be regulated but an outright ban was unconstitutional).
58. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
59. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
60. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (essentially a continua-
tion of Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), in which the Court determined that the Four-
teenth Amendment was violated where a judge served on a trial in which some of the pro-
ceeds of an adjudged fine paid the judge’s salary).
61. Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 293 F.3d 128, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2002).
Writing for the court, then Judge Alito noted
The argument that an amicus cannot be a person who has “a pecuniary
interest in the outcome” also flies in the face of current appellate prac-
tice. A quick look at Supreme Court opinions discloses that corporations,
unions, trade and professional associations, and other parties with “pe-
cuniary” interests appear regularly as amici. Some of the Supreme Court
cases in which the greatest number of amici have filed illustrate this
point…. Parties with pecuniary, as well as policy, interests also appear
as amici in our court … I thus reject the appellants’ argument that an
amicus must be an impartial person not motivated by pecuniary con-
cerns.
Id. at 131-32.
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impartial appellate judges. But, for reasons noted below, only non-
government amici must disclose these interests to the courts.
B. STATUTORY BASED SUPREME COURT RULE MAKING: SCR AND FRAP
Although the 1789 Judiciary Act enabled the federal courts to craft
rules to effectuate the conduct of judicial business,62 Supreme Court rule
making appears to date to 1822, when it issued uniform rules of equity.63 In
1936, Charles Edward Clark, the dean of the Yale Law School and later a
judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, argued that since the
nation’s founding, the Court had a constitutional authority to enact rules of
appellate procedure but had not done so.64
There is a fundamental difference in the timing of a rule enactment be-
tween SCR and FRAP. The Court may create rules of practice that are lim-
ited to causes that are presented before it. Under the applicable statutory
construct, and unlike rules created for the judicial branch as a whole, the
Court is under no statutory requirement to give the public notice and an
opportunity to comment on a rule which solely regards practice before it.65
As evidence of the speed in which the SCR may be promulgated, the cur-
rent SCRs were issued on April 19, 2013, and became effective on July 1,
2013. The first rules for practice before the Court were promulgated in
1790, and were partly based on an expectation of professionalism.66 Alt-
62. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). (this Act, in part, enabled
the judiciary “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business
in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.”);
See, THE STATES AND FEDERAL COURTS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO HISTORY, POWERS, AND
CONTROVERSY 166 (Christopher P. Banks ed., 2017) (discussing the 1789 Act).
63. See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation:” Article III, Equi-
ty, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 273 (2010) (discussing
the 1822 rules).
64. Charles E. Clarke, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (1936).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012). This rule states:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.
Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of prac-
tice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title.
Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) must be read alongside 28 U.S.C. §
2071(b)) (“Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the Supreme Court, under subsection
(a) shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for
comment. Such rule shall take effect upon the date specified by the prescribing court and
shall have such effect on pending proceedings as the prescribing court may order.”).
66. Appointment, 2 U.S. 399 (1790). On February 5, 1790, the Court issued Rule 2
which read:
Ordered, That (until further orders) it shall be requisite to the admission
of attornies and counsellors to practice in this court, that they shall have
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hough the first amicus brief appeared before the Court in 1823, it was not
until 1939 when the Court issued its first rule on amicus briefs.67 The 1939
SCR, like its current version, required prospective amici—except for the
United States—to obtain the consent of the named parties.68
The creation of the FRAP and the length of time for amendments to
take effect require a brief contextual history, beyond the fact that the FRAP
is a much newer rule set than the SCR. In 1948, Congress codified the judi-
ciary’s rule making power, and in doing so, recognized, as evidenced by the
statute’s language, a broad sweep of judicial power.69 Over time, Congress
enabled the Court to craft rules for appellate procedure alongside its author-
ity to enact rules of civil procedure and evidentiary rules.70 The FRAP’s
immediate history began in 1958 when Congress authorized the Judicial
Conference of the United States to perform “a continuous study of the rules
of practice and Procedure in the United States Courts and to recommend to
the Supreme Court from time to time such changes. . . as the Conference
believes may improve the administration of justice.”71 The Judicial Confer-
ence was created by Congress in 1922, on the advice of Chief Justice Wil-
liam Howard Taft.72 This act enabled a chief justice to call an annual con-
ference of the senior appellate judges to propose legislation to Congress
been such for three years past in the Supreme Courts of the State to
which they respectively belong, and that their private and professional
character shall appear to be fair.
Id.
67. See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
68. SUP. CT. R. 27.9.
A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed when accompanied by the writ-
ten consent of all parties to the case, except that consent need not be had
when the brief is presented to the United States or an officer or agency
thereof and sponsored by the Solicitor General, or by a State or a politi-
cal subdivision thereof. Such a brief must bear the name of member of
the bar of this Court.
Id.
69. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1948) (corresponds to Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
Stat. 961 (1948)). This act reads, “Each court established pursuant to an Act of Congress,
may, from time to time, prescribe rules for the conduct of its business. Such rules shall be
consistent with Acts of Congress and rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” Id. The prede-
cessor to this law was known as the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 in which Congress author-
ized the Court to create civil procedure rules. See, e.g., Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48
Stat. 1064; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) (amended 1990).
71. Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Robert L. Stern (Mar. 11, 1960) (on
file with the Library of Congress).
72. PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30
(1973); Peter Graham Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Admin-
istration, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 203-05 (1970); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 115 (1950).
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regarding the administration of the judiciary, and it also authorized the chief
justice to temporarily reassign district court judges to districts that were
inundated with large numbers of trials.73 The Conference’s duties have
since been expanded to recommend the addition, rescission, or modification
of rules, and then annually report to Congress the results of its meetings.74
In March 1960, Chief Justice Earl Warren convened an advisory
committee and appointed Judge E. Barrett Prettyman on the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia as its chair, as well as Judges Simon
Sobeloff on the Fourth Circuit, Richard T. Rives on the Fifth Circuit, Henry
Friendly on the Second Circuit, Stanley Barnes on the Ninth Circuit,
Shackelford Miller on the Sixth Circuit, and J. Edgar Murdock, the Chief
Judge of the U.S. Tax Court.75 The advisory committee circulated its first
draft of the proposed rules in 1964. Very little discussion appears to have
been undertaken regarding amicus briefs and the contentious areas of the
rules arose in terms of a proposed uniform system for assembling records of
trial for appellate review because each circuit had developed different
standards from the others, but there were also differences between civil and
criminal trials.76 On the other hand, there was an overriding consensus that
the FRAP should align with the SCR where possible.77
On December 4, 1967, the Court issued the first rules of appellate pro-
cedure for Congressional review.78 These rules were largely identical to the
1964 proposal. Congress did not oppose the federal appellate procedural
73. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837 (1922) (codified as amended 28
U.S.C. § 218 (1940)); See also J. Clifford Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill? The Alter-
native of Judicial Councils of the Circuits, 51 IND. L. J. 297, 311 (1976).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2008).
75. Letter from Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 21,
1960); Letter from Judge Albert Marris to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Jan. 30, 1961) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers Box 744). Also serving on the committee
were Willard Gatchell, the general counsel of the Federal Power Commission, Judge Wil-
liam Jameson on the United States District Court for Montana, and Joseph O’Meara, the
dean of Notre Dame’s law school. See Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, Letter from
Chief Justice Earl Warren to Judge Simon E. Sobeloff (Mar. 24, 1960) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
76. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONF.
OF THEU.S. (Comm. Print 1967) (Primarily the work of Albert B. Marris).
77. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Stern to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 21, 1961)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers Box 744).
78. Fed. R. App. P., 389 U.S. 1063 (1968); See Sherman L. Cohn, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 GEO. L. J. 431, 438-40 (1967) (discusses the judi-
cial history of the creation of the FRAP, and a general consensus that appellate procedural
rules garnered little interest in comparison to trial rules). Professor Cohn doubted that the
Court possessed the authority to issue the appellate rules for civil verdicts, and did not, as
evidenced in his article, have access to the judicial correspondences which are now availa-
ble. Sherman L. Cohn, The Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 GEO. L. J.
431, 438-40 (1967).
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rules, in all likelihood, because these rules were procedural rather than sub-
stantive, and the rules took effect on July 1, 1968.79 In comparison, when,
in 1972, the Court proposed the first federal evidentiary rules, Congress did
not approve of the Court’s proposal because many of the rules were deter-
mined to be substantive and therefore invasive of the legislative branch’s
authority.80
In terms of amicus practice, it is clear that the advisory committee be-
lieved in the importance of a uniform rule. The committee noted that as of
1964, only three of the eleven circuits regulated the filing of amicus briefs
and those circuits which did not formally regulate amici required prospec-
tive amici to motion the court.81 In instances where the United States was a
named party and objected, the courts tended to deny the prospective ami-
ci.82 The committee then recommended to the Judicial Conference that ami-
cus rules should be amended to enable interested persons to educate the
appellate courts against the government’s position.83
If the Court were to create a generalized rule of appellate procedure
within the FRAP, the process could take over a year.84 In 1988, Congress
modified the 1948 law by including language that the Supreme Court pos-
sessed authority to draft “rules for the conduct of its business.” 85 The 1988
modification did not directly note appellate procedure as being in need of
change, and it once more appears that Congress did not have any particular
concern for appellate procedural rules. Should a new rule be proposed for a
generalized appellate practice, the Court delegates its rule-making duties to
the Judicial Conference.86
Currently, for changes to the FRAP, the Conference, under the direc-
tion of the Chief Justice, relies on an advisory committee.87 The advisory
79. See, e.g., STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114th CONG. FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE WITH FORMS 23 (Comm. Print 2015). In spite of Congres-
sional silence, it should be noted that one federal court determined that the federal rules of
appellate procedure lessened a burden of proof in a suit against the Interstate Commerce
Commission, a federal agency. See, e.g., Am. Paper Inst. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n,
607 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
80. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1018 (1982); Arthur J. Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Rules of
Evidence, 5 SETONHALL L. REV. 667 (1974).
81. See Draft Rule 29 (1961) (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl Warren
Papers Box 744).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012); See also, About the Rulemaking Process,
UNITED STATES COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process
85. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4650 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988)).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)-(b) (1988).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(c) (1988).
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committee first accepts proposed changes to existing rules from a member
of the interested public.88 If the advisory committee finds a proposal merito-
rious, its members draft a proposed rule change and then seek comment
from federal judges, state chief justices, state attorneys general, United
States Attorneys, law schools, and law associations.89 After a six month
period for comment, the advisory committee then forwards a recommenda-
tion to the standing committee on appellate rules which, in turn, decides
whether to recommend to the Judicial Conference the proposed rule
change.90 If the Conference recommends adopting the change, it must for-
ward the proposed change to the Court and, in the event the Court adopts
the change, it must transmit the proposal to Congress by May 1 of the year
that the rule is to go into effect.91 Congress then has seven months to either
accept the rule by acquiescence or to override it by a vote.92 In essence,
through this construct, Congress recognizes the Court’s inherent power in
judicial rule making by placing into the language of the law the truism that
the Court’s rules, even when these contradict a law, replaces the law until
Congress acts.93
C. AMICUS FILING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: IMPOSITION OF ETHICS RULES
ON PRIVATE LITIGANTS BUT EXEMPTIONS ON THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND OTHER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS
The Supreme Court determines the procedural timelines and permissi-
bility of amicus filing in its own hearings through the SCR. In the SCR’s
plain language, the Court has recognized not only the legitimacy but also
the importance of amicus briefs.94 With limited exception, persons or or-
ganizations filing amicus briefs must have the consent of the parties prior to
the filing for the Court to accept the amicus arguments.95 However, a par-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 28 U.S.C. §331 (2012).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). This statute reads: “Such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Id.
94. Sup. Ct. R. 37(1) states:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant
matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of con-
siderable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve
this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored. An amicus
curiae brief may be filed only by an attorney admitted to practice before
this Court as provided in Rule 5.
SUP. CT. R. 37(1).
95. Sup. Ct. R. 37(2)(a) states in pertinent part:
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ty’s denial of consent to the person or organization does not automatically
disqualify the Court from considering the brief since, according to its own
rules the Court permits the person or organization to motion the Court to
consider the brief.96 In such an event, the person or organization is required
to “state the nature of the movant’s interest.”97 The Court also has the in-
herent authority to invite a potentially interested person or organization to
file an amicus brief, though when it has done so, the invitation is almost
solely made to the solicitor general.98 The Court’s rules facially disfavor
consideration of amicus briefs where the parties object to the filing.99 While
today the Court is generally welcoming of amicus briefs, this has not al-
ways been the case. In 1903 Chief Justice Fuller denied a private entity the
ability to file a brief where no litigant approved of the brief and the entity
did not appear to have an interest in the outcome.100 In 1949 Justice Frank-
furter echoed Fuller’s view in a proposal to the Court to prevent having the
Court “exploited as a soap box or as an advertising medium, or as [a] target.
. . .”101 But Frankfurter did not speak for the Court as a whole and Justice
Black wanted to further open the Court to amici when the solicitor general
had already presented an amicus.102
The modern Court’s approach to accepting amicus briefs was, in part,
formed as a result of cases in which the solicitor general opposed amicus
briefs in appeals arising from the prosecutions of suspected communists as
well as challenges to state and federal limitations placed on suspected “sub-
An amicus curiae brief submitted before the Court’s consideration of
a petition for a writ of certiorari, motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary
writ may be filed if accompanied by the written consent of all par-
ties, or if the Court grants leave to file under subparagraph 2(b) of
this Rule.
SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(a).
96. SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(b).
97. Id.
98. James L. Cooper, Note, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65
IND. L. J. 675, 690 (1990).
99. SUP. CT. R. 37(2)(b).
100. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903).
101. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Supreme Court Justice, to the
Supreme Court (Oct. 28, 1949) (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers).
Concededly, Frankfurter presented an argument in this memorandum which could be used in
opposition to a transparency rule when he wrote: “I am suggesting that we ought not to
countenance belief in others that we are amenable, or the assumption that such pressure is
legitimate. Even the best of laymen do not understand these things and we ought not unwit-
tingly to countenance wrong popular notions.” Id. However, as noted below, Frankfurter
changed his opinion on this subject because of the Justice Department’s conduct.
102. See Letter from Fred M. Vinson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to William
O Douglas, Assoc. Supreme Court Justice, (Oct. 17, 1949) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, William O Douglas Papers Box 380).
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versive organizations.”103 In 1952, Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion in
On Lee v. United States, and, in contrast to his earlier position, sought to
liberalize the use of amicus briefs on the basis that well researched amici
aided the Court.104 But he also hinted that amicus practice ought to have
something of a “level playing field.”105 In Frankfurter’s first draft of his
concurrence, he accused the solicitor general of flagrantly trying to ensure
that the government’s position was not overcome by amici.106 That same
year, in United States v. Lovknit, which resulted in a denial of certiorari,
Frankfurter insisted that while the solicitor general had refused consent for
the Congress of Industrial Organizations to file an amicus brief, the refusal
was “in no wise governed by a rule of this Court or the policy underlying
it.”107 In 1957, Frankfurter explained his change in opinion by noting that in
both On Lee and in Lance v. United States, an appeal which the Court de-
nied certiorari, the government had acted in disregard of the fairness princi-
ples underlying amicus practice.108 The same year, the solicitor general op-
103. PAUL M. COLLINS JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND
JUDICIALDECISIONMAKING 42-45 (2008)
104. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952) (Frankfurter memorandum). In
his dissent, Frankfurter urged that the police methods employed–the use of a warrantless
intrusion into a defendant’s place of business – was unconstitutional and would lead to slov-
enly police work. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 761 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
105. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 924 (1952). Frankfurter’s statement:
For the Solicitor General to withhold consent automatically in order to
enable this Court to determine for itself the propriety of each application
is to throw upon the Court a responsibility that the Court has put upon all
litigants, including the Government, preserving to itself the right to ac-
cept an amicus brief in any case where it seems unreasonable for the liti-
gants to have withheld consent. If all litigants were to take the position
of the Solicitor General, either no amici briefs (other than those that fall
within the exceptions of Rule 27, 28 U.S.C.A.) would be allowed, or a
fair sifting process for dealing with such applications would be nullified
and an undue burden cast upon the Court. Neither alternative is condu-
cive to the wise disposition of the Court's business.
Id.
106. See, First Draft of Felix Frankfurter’s concurrence in On Lee (on file with Har-
vard University, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 31 at 443). However, according to one study,
Frankfurter shortly after sought to limit the numbers of amicus briefs to the Court. See, Bri-
anne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE
L. J. 1, 36 (2011) (citing to Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amicus Curiae Before
the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784 (1990)).
107. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice to the Supreme Court,
(Jan. 14, 1952) (on file with Princeton University Special Collections, John Marshall Harlan
Papers Box 594).
108. Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Conference (Oct. 15, 1957) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers Box 656). Frankfurter noted to the justices that he
“animadverted against this disregard by the United States of its responsibility under our
Rule.” Lance v. United States arose from a trial in which the government prevailed in a case
22 NORTHERN ILLINOISUNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38-1
posed Linus Pauling, a Nobel chemist accused of communist sympathies,
filing an amicus brief on behalf of William Schneiderman, a former Com-
munist Party member convicted of perjury. Although Justice Brennan had
wanted the Court to consider the brief, he did not have enough support to
overcome justices who sided with the government, even though other jus-
tices had found the solicitor general’s opposition distasteful.109 A rule plac-
ing the executive branch on a “level playing field,” such as Frankfurter al-
luded to, can be achieved by requiring disclosure of the key officers’ finan-
cial holdings.
The idea of the Court’s desire to create a “level playing field,” in ami-
cus practice has not, in the past, been fully analyzed through available pri-
mary sources, but even a partial analysis supports a transparency rule. On
November 4, 1952 Chief Justice Fredrick Vinson assigned Justices Stanley
Reed, Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Robert Jackson to a committee
for the revision of the SCR.110 In turn, Reed, with the concurrence of the
committee, appointed Charles Horsky to serve as its advisor. It is important
to note that On Lee was argued on April 24, 1952 and decided on June 2,
1952. The committee issued its preliminary report on December 29,
1952.111 Their report condemned the Department of Justice for refusing
erstwhile amici consent to file, and recommended that such amici be per-
mitted to file motions to overcome government opposition.112 Most telling-
ly, the report hinted that the Justice Department did not have a right to have
a greater influence on the Court by using tactics to stifle the arguments of
interested persons.113
Beginning with the Warren Court, there was an increase in the submis-
sion of amicus briefs.114 The Court appeared to recognize that a liberaliza-
tion of amicus practice would occur as a result of its 1953 revision of the
SCR.115 In 1966, the Clerk of the Court, John Davis, suggested to Warren
against a contractor but the district court determined that the interest awarded against the
government accrued only after the court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination on interest accrual. See Lance, Inc. v.
United States, 190 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 915 (1952).
109. See Court Memorandum regarding Yates v. United States (Nov. 2, 1956) (on
file with the Library of Congress, William Brennan Papers Box I-i).
110. Memorandum from Frederick Vinson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to
the Supreme Court (Nov. 4, 1952) (on file with the Library of Congress, Hugo Lafayette
Black Papers Box 318).
111. Preliminary Report from Warner Gardner and Charles Horsky (Dec. 29, 1952)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Hugo Lafayette Black Papers Box 318).
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id.
114. Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Appellate Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 315, 316 (2008).
115. Letter of transmittal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Com-
mittee on Revision of the Rules (Sept. 1, 1953) (on file with the Library of Congress, Hugo
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that there was a need to modify the rules governing amicus because “in
recent years the Court has almost, without exception, granted leave of inter-
ested parties to file such briefs, and the motion procedure is becoming al-
most a matter of form.”116 Perhaps this was a result of Justice Black’s ef-
forts during the 1953 rules revision. Although he did not serve on the com-
mittee, Black published a memorandum that explained his oppositions to
restrictions against amici imposed by the Justice Department in more vigor-
ous terms than the committee. In his earlier “pencil draft,” he accused the
SCR and Justice Department of placing “insuperable obstacles” against
persons from bringing legal arguments and facts to the Court that the litigat-
ing parties were unable to do.117 In his later published memorandum Justice
Black omitted his accusatory language but noted his reasons for an expand-
ed amicus practice was twofold. First, because “most of the cases before the
Court involve matters that effect more people than the immediate record
parties,” and second, that a more open amicus practice would better serve
“the public interest.”118 In essence, Black sought to democratize amicus
practice, but in doing so, like the committee, he wanted to ensure that the
executive branch was not entitled to an advantageous position over other
litigants.
The FRAP, in its current form, requires a person or organization seek-
ing to file an amicus brief to obtain the permission of the litigating parties
or by special motion to the appellate court.119 Both the FRAP and SCR ex-
empt the United States from having to obtain the permission of the litigat-
ing parties, or motion the respective Court to receive an amicus brief.120
Both rules enable states, cities, and municipalities to file amicus briefs
without the consent of the named parties.121 The FRAP enable amicus fil-
ings before an appeal is heard on the merits, as well as in motions for re-
Lafayette Black Papers Box 318). The report noted, “consent is now liberally given except to
obvious propaganda groups and two subdivisions of groups otherwise represented; and it
may be ventured that the Court can, by appropriate informal suggestion to the then Solicitor
General prevent a future recurrence if it desires to do so.” Id.
116. Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk of the Supreme Court, to Earl Warren, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court (Sept. 27, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress, Earl
Warren Papers Box 656).
117. Personal notes from Hugo Black, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court (1953)
(on file with the Library of Congress, Hugo Lafayette Black Papers Box 318).
118. Memorandum from Hugo Black, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to the
Rules Conference (Apr. 4, 1954) (on file with the Library of Congress, Hugo Lafayette
Black Papers Box 318).
119. FED. R. APP. P. 29.
120. Id. at (a)(2). The rule states: “When Permitted. The United States or its officer
or agency or a state may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or
leave of court. Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief
states that all parties have consented to its filing.” Id.
121. Id.
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consideration, and for en banc review.122 In such instances, government
attorneys do not have to obtain the consent of the named parties or motion
the court to file.123 Neither the SCR nor the FRAP provide a means for a
litigating party to object to a court of appeals (or Supreme Court) review of
an amicus brief.
There are other significant differences between private amici and the
government. The FRAP imposes a transparency rule on corporate entities
filing amicus briefs to disclose all investment holdings so that the presiding
judges are able to determine whether recusal is necessary.124 The statement
must identify any parent corporation, as well as publicly held corporations
that own more than ten percent of the amici’s stock, or state that no corpo-
ration exists.125 Similarly, the SCR places requirements on non-
governmental amici such as a statement informing the Court on persons or
entities who funded the research and writing of the brief, as well as any
relationship between the named party and the amici.126 The SCR also re-
quires notification to the Court as to whether the attorneys representing a
named party also assisted in the research or writing of the brief.127 Howev-
er, the SCR exempts the solicitor general from these requirements. Like the
SCR, the FRAP requires a corporate disclosure statement for all parties
named in a case heading or on the submission of a brief to the Court.128 But,
once more, the solicitor general and other federal agency counsel are ex-
empted from having to divulge senior executive branch officers’ potential
interest in the outcome of an appeal.
In addition to the modern history of modern judicial appellate rule
making, certain judicial statements support the enactment of a transparency
rule. For instance, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe-
line, the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, reiterated that
the federal judiciary was entrusted with the duty of ensuring impartial tri-
122. FED. R. APP. P. 29(b).
123. Id.
124. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)(4)(A).
125. FED. R. APP. P. 26.1; FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)(4)(A) (informs amici that compliance
with Rule 26.1 is required).
126. SUP. CT. R. 37(6).
127. Id.
128. Sup. Ct. R. 29(6) reads:
Every document, except a joint appendix or amicus curiae brief, filed by
or on behalf of a nongovernmental corporation shall contain a corporate
disclosure statement identifying the parent corporations and listing any
publicly held company that owns 10% or more of the corporation’s
stock. If there is no parent or publicly held company owning 10% or
more of the corporation’s stock, a notation to this effect shall be includ-
ed in the document.
SUP. CT. R. 29(6).
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bunals.129 Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, in Alaska Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation v. EPA noted that “[t]he principle that judicial de-
cisions cannot be reopened at the whim of the Executive or the Legislature
is essential to preserving separation of powers and judicial independence
free from coercive governmental pressures.”130 Justice Kennedy, along with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, objected to the EPA
overturning a state judicial decision by fiat.131 Applied more broadly, since
a solicitor general is permitted to influence the Court by the Court’s own
invitation for his/her views, or through an unrestrained amicus filing, the
solicitor general could potentially assist in such a judicial fiat. Surely, the
Court would desire to protect the judiciary from such a possibility.
II: DUTIES AND INFLUENCE OF THE SOLICITORGENERAL
The need for a transparency rule in amicus filings can also be under-
stood in light of the solicitor general’s statutory construct and history, as
well as in its institutional influence on the judiciary and the conflicting rep-
resentational theories of the solicitor general’s office. The solicitor general
of the United States is charged with the duty of representing the interests of
the nation.132 This is an amorphous standard, if, for no other reason than
that the nation is diverse and there are diverse interests within it. The solici-
tor general possesses a unique influence on the judiciary, in part because of
the Supreme Court’s historic allowance for the solicitor general to do so. In
addition to representing the executive branch’s claimed interests of the
United States, the office also serves as a “gatekeeper,” or “advisor,” as to
129. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982).
130. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 512 (2004) (Kenne-
dy J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 518.
132. 28 U.S.C.S. § 518 (LexisNexis 2017). This statute reads:
(a) Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs other-
wise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and
argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court and suits in the United
States Court of Federal Claims or in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and in the Court of International Trade in which
the United States is interested.
(b) When the Attorney General considers it in the interests of the United
States, he may personally conduct and argue any case in a court of the
United States in which the United States is interested, or he may direct
the Solicitor General or any officer of the Department of Justice to do so.
Id.
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whether the Court should grant certiorari in specific cases.133 Additionally,
the solicitor general also has an authority to “confess error” to the Court.
That is, she or he may inform the justices that the government’s argument
before a lower court was flawed and now seeks the Court to reverse an ear-
lier decision.134 While, historically, the Court does not bind the government
to its original position in the lower courts, there is no evidence that the
Court is reticent to examine a solicitor general amicus brief for inconsisten-
cies with the government’s past positions. Thus far, the Court has been si-
lent on the solicitor general’s conduct inMurphy Oil.135
The executive branch’s role in enabling the solicitor general to influ-
ence the federal judiciary is evidenced in the Code of Federal Regulations.
The solicitor general possesses both a decisional authority and a superviso-
ry authority over federal attorneys. She or he not only conducts or assigns
all appeals or arguments advocating the denial of certiorari before the Su-
preme Court, he or she also “supervises” federal attorneys involved these
processes.136 As an example, suppose that attorneys in the Food and Drug
Administration believe that a government policy is necessary to safeguard
the production of pharmaceuticals. Some of these attorneys may have even
crafted the policy, but if the policy is challenged in the federal courts, the
solicitor general may shape the arguments supporting the policy in a man-
ner differing from the intent of the policy’s drafters, or may determine to
concede that the policy is encumbered by legal impediments.137 The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the right of representing the
United States on appeals is the solicitor general’s alone.138 In 1994, the
133. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.S. § 516 (LexisNexis 2016); Margaret H. Lemos, The Solici-
tor General as a Mediator between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV 185 (2009);
SALOKAR, supra note 17, at 1.
134. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND THE RULE OF LAW 9 (1987); David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the
Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L. J. 2079 (1994).
135. At worst, the government may face a chiding by the Court. For instance, in
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87 (1953), Justice Jackson, in recognizing that the gov-
ernment had changed its position from the lower court, noted it, along with the other party,
“positions as nimbly as if dancing a quadrille.” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87
(1953).
136. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2017). This section reads: “Conducting, or assigning and
supervising, all Supreme Court cases, including appeals, petitions for and in opposition to
certiorari, briefs and arguments, and, in accordance with § 0.163, settlement thereof.” Id.
See also, e.g., RICHARD PACELLE, BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AND THE STRUCTURING OF RACE GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 5 (2005); Edward N.
Beiser et al., Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 480 (1990).
137. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2017).
138. United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Court favorably commented on the concentration of the solicitor general’s
authority over the individual agencies.139
The solicitor general determines whether to pursue appeals to the
courts of appeal as well.140 In cases in which the United States is not a
named or direct party, the solicitor general has the sole decision whether to
file an amicus brief to an appellate court, including the Supreme Court.141
No settlement, compromise offer, or acceptance by a federal agency may be
accomplished without the solicitor general’s approval.142 Finally, the solici-
tor general is charged with a duty of assisting the attorney general develop
legal policies for government operations.143
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Congress established the position of an attorney general in 1789, but
this cabinet officer was not given a staff and his salary was less than that of
the other cabinet officers.144 Much of the government’s litigation was
sourced to private attorneys, including in cases where the United States was
139. Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994)
(Authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court’s majority accepted the following commen-
tary into the opinion:
But the practice also serves the Government well; an individual Gov-
ernment agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the interest of
the Government in litigation than does the Solicitor General's office,
with its broader view of litigation in which the Government is involved
throughout the state and federal court systems. Whether review of a de-
cision adverse to the Government in a court of appeals should be sought
depends on a number of factors which do not lend themselves to easy
categorization. The Government as a whole is apt to fare better if these
decisions are concentrated in a single official.).
140. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2017). This section reads:
Determining whether, and to what extent, appeals will be taken by the
Government to all appellate courts (including petitions for rehearing en
banc and petitions to such courts for the issuance of extraordinary writs)
and, in accordance with § 0.163, advising on the approval of settlements
of cases in which he had determined that an appeal would be taken.
Id.
141. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (2017) (“Determining whether a brief amicus curiae will be
filed by the Government, or whether the Government will intervene, in any appellate
court.”).
142. 28 C.F.R. § 0.163 (2017). However, in instances where Congress has provided
authority to a specific agency, the agency can settle suits without the Solicitor General’s
approval. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (EEOC has authority to settle cases).
143. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(d) (2017). Assisting the Attorney General, the Deputy Attor-
ney General and the Associate Attorney General in the development of broad Department
program policy. Id.
144. Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 581 (1989).
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a party to an appeal.145 Caleb Cushing, while serving as attorney general
during Franklin Pierce’s presidency, opined that the President had the au-
thority to direct the attorney general to undertake litigation on behalf of the
United States.146 Since that time, no attorney general or solicitor general has
issued a formal statement in opposition to Cushing’s opinion.
After the Civil War, Attorney General Henry Stanberry informed
Congress that his office was unable to meet the demands of representing the
United States Government in the federal courts.147 The Office of the Solici-
tor General was created in 1870, during Ulysses S. Grant’s presidency. The
position was created as part of an overall governmental reorganization,
which also created the Department of Justice.148 Originally, Congress did
not intend for the Office of the Solicitor General or the Department of Jus-
tice to be a partisan entity.149
Rather, Congress intended for the government to have consistent and
centralized representation in the Court as well as centralized law enforce-
ment over federal matters.150 Grant nominated Benjamin Helm Bristow to
serve as the first Solicitor General. In two years, he argued over forty cases
to the Court, and developed a reputation for thoroughness and efficiency.151
His personal writings while in office evidence that he viewed his office as
having fidelity to the law over a transient government policy or for the po-
litical benefit of the administration. For instance, in response to a query
from the acting Secretary of the Interior as to why a large sale of Kansas
Native American land could not be sold in a single large bloc – and there-
fore bring a greater amount of money into the government – Bristow re-
sponded “when the language of a law is explicit and involved in no obscuri-
ty, there is no room for construction, and hence no occasion to look beyond
the letter of the law itself for its meaning and purpose.”152 In another letter,
145. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Presenting the Case of the United States as it should
be,” The Solicitor General in Historical Context,” Address to the Supreme Court Historical
Society, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 1, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/osg/about-office#N_7_
[https://perma.cc/NK9Z-WDHV].
146. See, e.g., Office and Duties of Att’y Gen., 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 335 (1854).
147. RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 13
(2012).
148. Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162, 162-63 (1870).
149. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Jus-
tice: Professionalization without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 126
(2014).
150. Id.
151. David D. Frederick, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: 1791 to the Present,
in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 382, 386 (Christopher
Tomlins ed., 2005).
152. Letter from B. H. Bristow, Solic. Gen., to B. R. Cowen, Acting Sec’y of the
Interior 369 (Sept. 18, 1871) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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Bristow noted that while he believed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s pro-
vision prohibiting former confederate officers from serving in the govern-
ment was a mistake, and that a liberal amnesty would aid Grant’s reelec-
tion, he would have to argue for enforcement of the prohibition until its
revocation.153 When Bristow resigned as solicitor general, he did not give
Grant any specific reason for his resignation. Bristow stated that “[I] trust
that your administration for the next term may be free from many of the
cares that I know have attended the first.”154
Since its creation, the solicitor general has a unique distinction in
United States law in that the office holder is the only government officer
required to be “learned in the law.”155 Although governmental ethics was
not the primary motivation for the creation of either the Department of Jus-
tice or the Office of the Solicitor General, there were expectations placed
on the solicitor general that in representing the United States, the solicitor
general would also be representing the “best interests” of the United
States.156 And, while the solicitor general can be viewed as a quasi-
independent office in the sense that the attorney general does not shape the
executive branch’s appeals, the solicitor general has, at times, acted to pro-
tect the president. For instance, in 1971 Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
opposed the government’s conduct leading to the so-called Pentagon Pa-
pers case, but dutifully argued the case to the Supreme Court.157
Although the federal government’s first amicus brief appears to have
occurred in 1854, the solicitor general did not file an amicus brief until
1909 to protect the constitutionality of a statute.158 The decision, the Second
Employers Liability Cases, arose from two railroad corporations’ challeng-
es to the Employer’s Liability Act of 1908.159 Ora L. Babcock, a fireman
employed by the Northern Pacific Railway, and Daniel Walsh, a brakeman
employed by the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad were killed
153. Letter from B. H. Bristow, Solic. Gen., to E. H. Bristow 369 (May 27, 1872) (on
file with the Library of Congress).
154. Letter from B. H. Bristow, Solic. Gen., to Ulysses S. Grant, President of the
U.S. 86 (Nov. 8, 1872) (on file with the Library of Congress).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2017) (“The President shall appoint in the Department of
Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the
law, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”).
156. See Wade H. McCree Jr., The Solicitor General and his Client, 59 WASH. U. L.
Q. 337 (1981).
157. See, e.g., Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor General: Executive Policy
Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1086 (1994).
158. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 96 (1993); Omari Scott Simmons,
Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 185, 213 (2009); see also Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. 478 (1855) (the first appeal in
which the United States filed an amicus brief). On the first Solicitor General amicus brief.
159. Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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while working.160 The trials and appeals, pitted the estates of the deceased
workers against the railroads.161 The United States was not a named party at
any time during this process. The railroad corporations objected to a federal
statute that required compensation to the families of the decedent and ar-
gued that traditional “master and servant law” was the sole province of the
state legislatures.162 Solicitor General Lloyd Bowers, with President Taft’s
permission filed an amicus brief which argued that Congress possessed the
authority to enact legislation governing workers’ compensation in interstate
commerce.163 The underlying purpose for the government’s amicus brief
was to protect congressional authority to enact laws to govern aspects of
interstate commerce.164 President Woodrow Wilson’s first Solicitor Gen-
eral, John W. Davis, filed six amicus briefs to the Court during his tenure
from 1913 to 1918, and later informed Robert Jackson that this ability made
the position “not to be sneezed at from a lawyer’s standpoint.”165 In con-
160. ALBERT EDWARD WILSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS’
LIABILITYACTS 8-10 (1917).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY: OPINIONS OF
THE STATE SUPREME COURTS AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT S. Doc. No. 62-475, at
144 (2d Sess. 1912). “The foregoing brief was prepared by the late Solicitor General Lloyd
W. Bowers, (who died in September, 1910) with his accustomed care and ability. In order
that it may be properly before this Court, I adopt it and ask its consideration – Attorney
General George Wickersham, December 1910.” Id.
163. See, e.g., Letter from Mosely to Att’y Gen. Wickersham (Apr. 22, 1910)
164. See, e.g., Letter from Mosely to Att’y Gen. Wickersham (Apr. 22, 1910) (on file
with the Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Reel 325). In which Mosely
lobbies the Justice Department to enforce railway safety rules in appealing four lower court
decisions to the Supreme Court. “One of the vital questions pending before the Supreme
Court is the question of the Constitutionality of the Interstate Railroad Employers Liability
Act involved in several appeals now on the docket.” Id.; see also Letter from Mosely to Taft
(Aug. 27, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Reel
325). He advises the President:
There are four Safety Appliance cases now pending on appeal in the Su-
preme Court of the United States. These cases are all important. Vital
questions of the extent of federal power are involved in each of them….
Sovereignty over the regulation of interstate commerce exists only in the
federal government. Where the necessity exists out of the complexity of
the traffic, that one power should alone regulate both intra and interstate
traffic, in order that any regulation of the latter may be effacious, the
power is ample in the federal government.
Id.
165. Letter from Davis to Jackson (Jan. 18, 1940) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Robert Jackson Papers Box 11). Jackson responded that “the work as Solicitor Gen-
eral was pleasant and stimulating, and compared to administrative work, is enduring.” Letter
from Jackson to Davis (Feb. 6, 1940) (on file with the Library of Congress, Robert Jackson
Papers Box 11).
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trast, the solicitor general filed nine amicus briefs for appeals already grant-
ed certiorari in the 2016 term alone.
It is true that on a very small number of occasions the solicitor general
has acted contrary to the executive branch’s claimed interests. The most
notable of these occurred in 1953 when Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff
disagreed with the executive branch’s assertion of national security necessi-
ty in Peters v. Hobby and recused himself from arguing the government’s
position.166 An officer of the United States was a named party in this case.
Warren Burger, who was then a Deputy Attorney General in charge of the
Department of Justice’s Civil Division, took Sobeloff’s place.167 Sobeloff’s
decision to recuse himself from the argument was not without its detractors.
Burger opined that Sobeloff had a duty to resign from the government.168
Sobeloff, in this instance, however, did nothing more than follow Bristow’s
example in refusing to argue for a position he viewed as contrary to law. In
another instance, in Bob Jones University v. United States, the acting solici-
tor general did not approve of the executive branch’s position in an appeal
arising from the question of whether the Internal Revenue Service had to
grant tax exempt status to private racially segregated schools.169
166. Herman Schwartz, Warren Earl Burger, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SUPREME COURT: THE LIVES AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE JUSTICES 92 (Melvin
Urofsky ed., 2009).
167. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); EARLM. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
OF WARREN BURGER: 1969-1986 9 (2000); CORNELL CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 55 (2015); ARCHIBALD COX,
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 300 (1987). Peters was a medical professor at Yale
University and the government had employed him as a special consultant to the United
States Public Health Service. The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare removed Peters from his consulting position after a loyalty review board deter-
mined, based on anonymous sources, that his loyalty to the United States was doubtful.
Although Peters was permitted to appeal the decision, the administrative process afforded
him only a limited right of confrontation. The Court, contrary to Burger’s argument, found
that the administrative process had denied Peters the due process required in adverse admin-
istrative hears. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 348 (1969). Essentially, the Court’s decision
and Sobeloff’s reasoning for refusing to argument for the government were in concert.
168. See e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREMECOURT (1979).
169. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); See, e.g., Brief for the
United States at 1, Goldboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981)
(No. 81-1) and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 81-3). In the
brief, the acting Solicitor General noted:
This brief sets forth the position of the United States on both questions
presented. The Acting Solicitor General fully subscribes to the position
set forth on question number two, only. His views on question one are
set forth in the Brief for the United States fied in this Court in September
1981, in response to the petitions for certiorari in these cases. Those
views are more fully developed in a draft brief on the merits which was
ready to be printed for timely filing in early January 1982. Copies of that
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Instead, the acting solicitor general merely referenced arguments made
before the lower courts as dispositive of the government’s position. How-
ever, just as in the case of Peters v. Hobby, the government was a party to
this case. Both of these instances show that the solicitor general possesses
limited institutional independence from the executive branch. However,
neither instance is practicable for assessing whether the ethical standards
regarding the solicitor general duties provide transparency and fairness for
parties appealing to the federal courts, and in particular, the Supreme Court.
On one occasion, a solicitor general authored an amicus brief where
the government had an interest that was so attenuated that the solicitor gen-
eral authored the brief in his private capacity. In 1938, Robert Hougwout
Jackson, advised an organization preparing an amicus brief to the Ohio
courts on behalf of Edward Lamb, an attorney facing disbarment.170 Lamb
was a member of the Lawyer’s Guild, the Congress of International Organi-
zations, and he represented a labor union. During a state trial, the judge
accused him of disrespecting the state courts.171 The trial judge appointed a
committee to investigate Lamb’s conduct and then adopted the committee’s
recommendation to disbar Lamb.172 The Chicago Tribune reported public
criticism against Jackson for filing an amicus as a solicitor general, as well
as his response in which he believed that he had an obligation to ensure the
judiciary’s fairness to all litigants and attorneys.173 In answering a citizen
who criticized him, Jackson responded, “[w]e can have no worthy judicial
system unless we protect the right of advocates to champion the cause of
any person who becomes involved in the machinery of the law.”174
Although one could point out Sobeloff’s independence and Jackson’s
willingness to represent his position in an amicus brief to a state court, there
are examples of a solicitor general advocating a presidential position, re-
gardless of the fairness to the party in opposition. For much of World War
II, Charles Fahy served as solicitor general. According to historian Peter
Irons, Fahy suppressed countervailing evidence and argued that it was nec-
draft brief were furnished by the Department of Justice in late January
1982, pursuant to request, to the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee, along with other documents re-
quested by those committees.
Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar- The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21
LOY. L.A. L. REV 1187, 1187-88 n.3 (1988).
170. Brief for Robert H. Jackson as Amici Curiae, In the Matter of Charges Against
Edward Lamb (1938) (No. 29986) (on file with the Library of Congress).
171. See, Note, The Lamb Disbarment Proceedings, 47 YALE L. J. 1383 (1938).
172. Id.
173. Chesley Manley, Jackson Fights Disbarment of C.I.O. Attorney: Solicitor Gen-
eral Backs Ohio Lawyer, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1938, at 11.
174. Letter from Jackson to William S. Daley (June 7, 1938) (on file with the Library
of Congress, Robert H Jackson Papers Box 82).
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essary to uphold President Franklin Roosevelt’s order to intern United
States citizens who were of Japanese descent.175 That is, the Office of Naval
Intelligence concluded that there was little to no threat to the United States
from the class of persons interned.176 Moreover, not only were the majority
of persons imprisoned United States citizens, their imprisonment occurred
as a result of an executive branch order.177 In 1962, Fahy wrote to Attorney
General Francis Biddle, “I thought the evacuation unnecessary and unwise
but did think it would be upheld as constitutional if the military decided it
was necessary.”178 Whether Fahy deliberately suppressed evidence from the
Court or engaged in selective presentation of evidence is not the subject of
this article, other than to point out that wholesale judicial deference to the
President during crisis time has its dangers when the United States is a
named party and that the proposed transparency rule could help prevent
another occurrence.
Even if Fahy engaged in selective presentation, he is not the only so-
licitor general to do so in the national security context. In 1954, as Sobeloff
prepared to argue the government’s position in United States ex rel Toth v.
Quarles on the constitutionality of a statute that enabled the military to as-
sert court martial jurisdiction over discharged soldiers who had been ac-
cused of committing a crime while on active duty, he too kept important
information from the Court.179 Toth originated when a former service mem-
ber was forced back into active duty to face a court martial. Historically,
military jurisdiction was held to be unconstitutional when exercised over
civilians and, unlike a retired service member, a discharged service member
was (and is) by legal status, a civilian.180 During Sobeloff’s argument, he
presented evidence to the Court that the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Canada–three legal systems somewhat akin to the United States–also per-
mitted extended military jurisdiction.181 However, during his preparations
175. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 205-06 (1993).
176. Id.
177. See, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320
U.S. 115 (1943). On March 21, 1942 Congress confirmed the Executive Order. See, Act of
Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
178. Letter from Fahy to Biddle (Dec. 12, 1962) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Charles Fahy Papers 2). Biddle answered Fahy, “I know that you argued the
Korematsu case, and with some distaste.” Letter from Biddle to Fahy (Dec. 19, 1962) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Charles Fahy Papers 2).
179. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
180. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex Parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2 (1866).
181. Simon Sobeloff, Notes, Draft Arguments, undated (1955) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress, Simon Sobeloff Papers Box 26); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW
THE SUPREMECOURTDECIDESCASES 117 (1996).
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he also learned that key legal officers in each of these countries expressed
doubts on the legal efficacy of continuing the practice in their own legal
systems, and in a short time the British, Australian, and Canadian govern-
ments would terminate their broad analogous extension of military jurisdic-
tion.182 Unlike Korematsu, the government did not prevail in Toth and the
case was decided by a vote of six to three against the executive branch. Yet,
this episode does provide evidence that a wholesale deference to the solici-
tor general can deprive the Court of important information and perhaps
there might have been a unanimous opinion.
B. THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION
Who the solicitor general represents bears equally on the question of
fairness to the named parties in an appeal when the United States is not a
party, as it does on the Court’s ability to protect its own integrity. More
than one scholar has argued that the solicitor general represents the presi-
dent.183 Michael Solimine, in his study on the solicitor general concluded
that the decision to file an amicus brief is a political process either in fact,
or by perception.184 Louis Fisher opined that the solicitor general’s “impar-
tial” objectives are frequently subordinated to the “particular and immediate
needs of the president.”185 Professor Joshua Schwartz, a former assistant to
the solicitor general, argued that a recognized “limited independence,”
while not constitutionally mandated, does provide the solicitor general a
degree of moral authority in using the office to inform the Court that the
national interests inherent in an appeal should be granted certiorari.186
If there is a scholarly debate as to whom a solicitor general represents,
it may be because solicitor generals have hardly been uniform in their views
as to whom they represent. In 1969, Erwin Griswold opined that the solici-
tor general’s office had a two-fold duty to represent the executive branch,
182. Letter from W.S. McKinnon to Kuhfeld (Sept. 9, 1955); Letter from C.E. Long
to Kuhfeld (Aug. 13, 1955); Letter from Kuhfeld to Sobeloff (Sept. 11, 1955); See also,
Simon Sobeloff, Brief to the Court (on file with the Library of Congress, Simon Sobeloff
Papers Box 26). Although Sobeloff briefed the Court that Britain, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand had laws permitting continuing jurisdiction over former servicemen similar to
that as had been used to justify Toth’s recall and court-martial, he failed to disclose that such
courts-martial had never been held or the allied officers’ opinions as to why this was so.
183. See, e.g., CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 58-61 (1992); JEFFREY A. SEGAL&HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREMECOURT AND THEATTITUDINALMODELREVISITED 411 (2002).
184. Solimine, supra note 17, at 1203.
185. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS A POLITICAL
PROCESS 26 (1988).
186. Joshua Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General’s Independence, 21
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (1988).
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but also to aid the Court.187 In 1955, Simon Sobeloff stated, “The solicitor
general is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for a client
whose business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My client's chief
business is not to achieve victory, but to establish justice.”188 In his exposi-
tion on this subject, Sobeloff also distinguished the duty of representing the
United States from representing a private litigant. Unlike a private litigant’s
attorney, he believed that the solicitor general had to be cognizant that a
change in the law could affect a function of the United States Government
for decades.189
A decade earlier, Francis Biddle, who served as solicitor general on
the eve of the United States’ entry into World War II before becoming at-
torney general, opined that the solicitor general is “responsible neither to
the man who appointed him nor to his immediate superior. . . [and has] no
master to serve except his country.”190 Biddle’s opinion is problematic for
the simple reason that if it were cemented into law, the executive branch
would be without its foremost appellate representative to defend it. Moreo-
ver, Biddle did not always shy from providing political advice on potential
appeals to protect Roosevelt’s New Deal majority in Congress. In 1940,
Biddle and (then) Attorney General Robert Jackson advised Senator Rich-
ard Russell against enacting a bill to deport Harry Bridges, a foreign na-
tional leader of the nation’s largest longshoreman’s union who was accused
of spreading communism, because such a bill would constitute a bill of
attainder.191 Biddle also implored Attorney General Jackson to issue a
statement that Bridges remained under investigation because he feared that
at least three congressional seats held by pro-New Deal Democrats would
be lost in the general election that November.192
Biddle’s opinion on a solicitor general’s duties, moreover, hardly ap-
pears to be the prevailing view. Theodore Olson a solicitor general during
George W. Bush’s presidency, lauded former solicitor general Rex Lee for
his performance in Dames & Moore v. Regan as an example of the im-
portance in sustaining a president’s Article II authority during times of na-
tional crisis.193 The government’s position and the Court’s decision resulted
187. Erwin Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General - Representing the Interests
of the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 535 (1969)
188. Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government: The Work of the Solicitor
General's Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229 (Mar. 1955).
189. Id. at 230.
190. FRANCISBIDDLE, IN BRIEFAUTHORITY 97-98 (1962).
191. Letter from Jackson to Richard Russell (June 18, 1940) (on file with the Library
of Congress, Robert Jackson Papers Box 86).
192. Letter from Biddle to Jackson (Aug. 22, 1940) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Robert Jackson Papers Box 86).
193. Transcript: In Memory of Rex E. Lee (1937-1996), Rex E. Lee Conference on
the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States, The Advocate as Friend: The Solici-
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in private litigation being terminated by judicial fiat to sustain the foreign
policy authority of the executive branch.194 While in this instance, the solic-
itor general represented the secretary of the treasury as a named party and
not as an amicus, it does evidence that the advocacy was partly based on the
protection of a policy rather than wholly as a sustainment of law.195 Ken-
neth Starr opined that the solicitor general provides consistency in the gov-
ernment’s litigation by controlling the appellate processes.196
William Howard Taft served as solicitor general for a two-year stint
beginning in February 1890. His view on representation appears to be that
he had a duty to align with the President. In one instance arising from a
challenge against the government’s taxation of a distillery, Taft informed
his father that he had little confidence in the government’s case, but the
Court had the final authority to decide which side was in the right.197 Im-
plied in this comment is that Taft felt he had to advocate for President Ben-
jamin Harrison even though he believed that the government would lose its
appeal. After a year in the position, Taft described to his father that while
he had some authority over which cases to appeal, he still consulted with
the attorney general before filing a brief.198 In perhaps the most telling in-
stance on how Taft viewed his position, he determined that he would vigor-
ously argue the McKinley Tariff Act’s legal validity to the Court, even
though it was an unpopular bill and he had previously advised President
Harrison that it was an unwise law.199
Charles Fried, who served as solicitor general from 1985 to 1989, pro-
vides a key example of a solicitor general’s loyalty to the policies of a pres-
ident. In 1980, Ronald Reagan ran for office with a promise to end abor-
tion.200 Although in 1973, the Court had, in Roe v. Wade, accepted that
tor General's Stewardship Through the Example of Rex E. Lee, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7
(2003).
194. See, e.g., Joel S. Telpner, Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan: Rethinking the Fifth
Amendment Implications of the Iranian Hostage Agreement, 68 IOWA L. REV. 123 (1982).
195. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). On criticism of this decision
see, e.g., Arthur S. Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political
Court, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1104 (1981); J.R. Cooke, Dames & Moore v. Regan, Rights in
Conflict: The Fifth Amendment Held Hostage, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 345 (1981).
196. Edward Beiser, Remark: Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475,
480 (1990).
197. Letter from William Howard Taft to Alphonso Taft (Jan. 6, 1891) (on file with
the Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Reel 17).
198. Letter from William Howard Taft to Alphonso Taft (Feb. 14, 1891) (on file with
the Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Reel 17).
199. Letter from William Howard Taft to Alphonso Taft (Mar. 7, 1891) (on file with
the Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Reel 17). The Tariff was addressed
by the Court in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
200. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS 364 (2010).
Kalman, however, correctly noted that abortion had become a national political issue in 1972
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women had a lawful right to obtain abortions, both the Court and the con-
tinuance of abortions remained a politically charged issue which divided the
nation.201 In 1986, Fried argued in an amicus brief to the Court to overturn
Roe in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists.202 In other words, the United States was not a party to this appeal,
yet the solicitor general filed a brief mirroring the President’s election
promises in both 1980 and 1984, leading to accusations that Fried had polit-
icized his office.203
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who authored Roe, wanted to publicly re-
proach Fried for his actions in Thornburgh by including the statement “for
the solicitor general to ask us to discard a line of major constitutional rul-
ings in a case where no party has made a similar request urges that we take
occasion to overrule those cases, is, to say the least, unusual.”204 While Jus-
tice Lewis Powell agreed with Blackmun that Fried’s conduct was overly
political, he successfully lobbied Blackmun not to specifically criticize the
solicitor general. Instead, Powell noted that the Court had already rebuffed
the solicitor general by denying him an oral argument as well as by reaf-
firming Roe v. Wade.205
Fried was not the first solicitor general to file an amicus brief that rep-
resented a presidential policy. According to former Solicitor General Drew
Days, when, in 1948, Solicitor General Philip Perlman filed an amicus brief
with the Court to urge that racially restrictive covenants were unconstitu-
tional, he did so with President Harry Truman’s support.206 The decision,
Shelly v. Kraemer, did not involve the United States as a litigant, but clearly
the United States had an interest in ensuring that housing discrimination
was found to be unconstitutional, not only as a reflection of the promise of
when President Nixon’s campaign accused his opponent, Senator George McGovern of
being a spokesman for “acid, amnesty, and abortion.” The “amnesty” allegation had to do
with McGovern’s position on the Vietnam Conflict. Id.
201. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
202. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE
OF LAW (1987).
203. See, e.g., Solicitor General, Has the Office Been Politicized? A.B.A. J., May 1,
1986, at 20; RAYMOND, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 172 (1997); SALOKAR, supra note 17, at 107; Solimine, supra note 17,
at 1195.
204. First Draft of Decision No 84-495, Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians,
Harry Blackmun, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 3, 1986) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Box 434).
205. Letter from Lewis Powell, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harry Blackmun,
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Feb. 6, 1986) (on file with the Library of Congress, Box 434).
206. Drew Days III, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with
Many Characters, 83 KY. L. J. 485, 489-90 (1994).
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equality under the law, but also because of critical foreign policy considera-
tions.207
Likewise, in 1953, Sobeloff filed an amicus brief siding with the
NAACP in Brown v. Board of Education, after he and Attorney General
Herbert Brownell determined that it was in the interests of the nation to do
so, because vast populations in other lands considered communism a viable
alternative to democracy and also because segregation evidenced a failure
in democracy.208
In contrast to the solicitor general’s actions in Shelley and Brown,
which were based on a position of best interests of the United States, in
1977, President James Earl (“Jimmy”) Carter’s White House Counsel
shaped the government’s amicus brief in Board of Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke to prevent alienating Carter’s key demographic sup-
port.209 Bakke presented a challenge to a state affirmative action program
where a rejected white applicant to a medical school believed that his objec-
tive application scores were higher than those of admitted minorities, and
therefore the university had used an impermissible discrimination against
him.210 It is unsurprising that the solicitor general would have filed an ami-
cus brief because the state medical school received federal money, and, by
1977, affirmative action had become a pronounced political issue.211 The
solicitor general’s initial draft, however, denounced the university’s affirm-
ative action program as unconstitutional. Although, after Carter’s counsel
and advisors opposed the brief – and indeed contributed to its rewrite – the
brief urged upholding affirmative action in general.212 Whether or not one
supports affirmative action or educational diversity programs in general, the
fact that Carter instructed his personal counsel to jump into the drafting
process, provides clear evidence that, as in the case of the solicitor general
in Thornberg, amicus briefs have been shaped to promote political ends.213
207. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The moving force for the amicus action
appears to have been based on foreign relations. It became increasingly difficult to convince
foreign elites that American democracy was the better alternative to communism. See, e.g.,
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 78-84 (2000).
208. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Days III, supra note 206, at 489-
90; DUDZIAK, supra note 207, at 79.
209. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); LAURA KALMAN,
RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS 190-91 (2010) (Professor Kalman notes that Carter
received over 86% of votes cast by African American citizens). See also, MICHAEL J.
GREATZ AND LINDAGREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT
116-19 (2016).
210. KALMAN, supra note 209, at 190.
211. Id. at 195-96.
212. Id. at 197.
213. Id.
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The varying representational approaches by the solicitor general
makes it difficult to determine a singular model of representation. Certainly,
the best interest of the United States standard has proven to be incredibly
malleable. Professor David A. Strauss, a former assistant to the Solicitor
General identified two possible approaches to defining the relationship be-
tween the solicitor general and the President.214 The first of the approaches,
the Institutional Approach, assumes that the solicitor general represents the
actions and regulations of the government that have been legally crafted,
shaped, and defended by government lawyers in various agencies.215 This
approach is not predicated on an assumption that only lawyers have been
involved in the process of developing policies and regulations or in making
enforcement decisions.216 Rather, it considers that government lawyers have
simply been involved in this process along with other experts, and the solic-
itor general is defending the legal basis of the executive branch’s actions.217
The second approach – titled as “the administrative approach” - is that the
solicitor general has a duty to defend and advance the President’s agenda,
even when the agenda contradicts a government agency’s earlier determina-
tions, or when the executive branch’s position may harm a government
agency’s ability to conduct the duties entrusted to it by Congress.218 Alt-
hough Professor Strauss does not label this approach as unitary, he does
characterize it with the view that the President and the executive branch are
one and the same, and in following Professor Strauss’s characterization of
the administrative approach, the solicitor general, as chief counselor of the
branch must maintain a fidelity to the President.219 In examining the solici-
tor general’s approach to national security type appeals, it appears that the
administrative approach tends to prevail.
C. BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Just as there is no uniform opinion as to whom the solicitor general
represents, there is no uniform definition for best interest of the United
States. There are categories of appeals in which the legal term best interests
of the United States, is given definition, but these definitions are specific to
the cause of action reviewed by the appellate court. Arguably, the best in-
214. David Strauss, The Solicitor General and Interests of the United States, 61 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 166 (1998).
215. Id. at 167.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Strauss, supra note 214, at 167; See also, Neal Devins, Unitariness and Inde-
pendence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
255, 256 (1994) (citing to Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative
Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A. J. 154, 218 (1960)).
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terests of the United States standard is most clear when there is a matter of
necessity such as during a crisis of national security. In Dames & Moore, a
negotiated agreement with Iran was at stake, and if the private litigation
was permitted to proceed, the agreement which enabled the return of Amer-
ican hostages would have been nullified.220 Further, as noted above, Dames
& Moore involved an agency of the executive branch as a party, and it is
unlikely that the executive branch would be in an amicus role in a national
security based appeal since invariably the government is a named party in
such appeals.
One problem with trying to define the standard of best interests begins
with the Court itself. For example, in 1961 the Court deferred to the attor-
ney general in determining whether, in the best interests of the United
States, a political organization could be considered as “subversive,” and
therefore must register with the Justice Department.221 Even when the Court
has informed the executive branch that the standard cannot be invoked
wholesale to abridge the due process rights of citizens, in the national secu-
rity context, it still shows a tendency to defer to the President by advising
him to cooperate with Congress. For example, in Green v. McElroy, the
Court held that a citizen denied a clearance to work in a defense industry
after being accused of having communist ties still possessed the right to
confront his accusers.222 However, the Court also observed that either the
President or Congress could narrow the right of confrontation in administra-
tive hearings through an order or by statute.223 In 1981, the Court accepted
that the Secretary of State possessed the authority to determine whether, in
the best interests of the United States, a citizen could be denied a passport
to travel abroad if the person presented a threat to national security.224 What
can be gleaned from the Court is that in the few instances where the term
“best interests of the United States” is considered, it occurs in the national
security context and the Court is deferential to the executive branch. Yet,
even if Dames & Moore had been correctly decided, the conduct of Fahy
and Sobeloff should weigh against using the national security model as a
reason to permit the executive branch to continue to file amicus briefs with-
out the transparency sought in the suggested ruleset.
220. See, e.g., 81 STATE DEP’T BULL. 1 (Feb. 1981); Declaration of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3-8 (1983).
221. Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
102 (1961).
222. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
223. Id.
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Outside of the national security context, the lower courts have present-
ed a better and less deferential best interest of the United States standard. In
federal contracting, the best interests of the United States does not preclude
judicial review, particularly where there is an allegation that an agency en-
gaged in bad faith or with impropriety.225
For instance, under the Administrative Procedures Act, an agency’s
administrative decisions are subject to judicial review if the agency appears
to have acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and if Congress has not
altogether foreclosed judicial review.226 Put another way, if there is evi-
dence that a government agency’s determination is arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion, a court may overturn it.227 While the act itself has
little applicability to the Court’s ability to issue rules for its internal govern-
ance, the terms arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, are helpful to
developing the best interests of the United States standard in assessing the
solicitor general’s use of amicus briefs.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act scheme, if a rejected con-
tractor files a protest against the government’s award of a bid to a competi-
tor, the awarded contract must be “stayed” and performance on the contract
ceased until the dispute is resolved.228 However, if the agency’s chief of-
ficer determines that performance on the contract must commence in the
best interests of the United States, the awarded contractor may begin work
and be paid within the contours of the awarded contract.229 There is a nar-
row window of opportunity for the rejected contractor to challenge the
agency’s determination of the best interests of the United States if there is
evidence that the agency’s officer abused his or her discretion by exceeding
a statute or made the determination in clear ignorance of important facts.230
Even recognizing the privacy interests involved in tax and investment rec-
ords, because amicus filing is a voluntary activity with no constitutional
basis, the proposed transparency rule is justifiable because the courts cannot
assess whether the government’s position in an amicus brief is based on the
225. See, e.g., SDS Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 363 (Fed. Cl. 2003); Top-
gallant Grp., Inc. v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting Curran v.
Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
226. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985). Both decisions arise from challenges under the Administrative Procedures
Act at 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2011).
227. 5 U.S.C. §§701(a)(1)-706 (2011). However, in Chong v Dir., U.S. Info. Agency,
821 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1987) the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that judi-
cial review can be precluded when “there are no judicially manageable standards” to enable
such review. Chong, 821 F.2d at 175.
228. See, e.g., Universal Shipping Co. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C.
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best interest of the United States standard or a personal–and therefore ca-
pricious–basis.
If judicial review exists for challenges to the best interests of the Unit-
ed States, where the United States is a named party, such review should
also exist where the executive branch seeks to influence or inform the Court
and the courts of appeals of governmental interest in the outcome of a case.
Moreover, because in amicus practice the solicitor general is effectively
siding with one of the named parties in litigation before the Court, the Court
is not only entitled to inquire into the executive branch’s motives, it should
also enable the arguing parties to effectively counter the government’s
built-in advantage of claiming that its amicus brief is filed in best interests
of the United States. Because the executive branch is far larger and more
powerful than other amici, it is not enough to provide the named parties
with access to the tax and investment records as defined in the introduction.
Public scrutiny, as Justice Miller opined, is the best means to ensure that the
judiciary is not used for a nefarious purpose.
III: CONCLUSION
Benjamin Bristow’s model of a non-partisan and transparent Solicitor
General’s office has not withstood the almost century and a half since he
served in that position. Justice Alito’s earlier observation on the nature of
interested amici is noteworthy to the premise of this article, because it is a
frank admission that the literal term friend of the court does not equate to a
neutral party. This is clearly the case in regard to the current presidency,
which has kept its tax and investment records sealed from the public’s view
in a manner not seen since 1974.231 This lack of transparency is troubling
for a myriad of reasons, including its potential to undermine two key ten-
ants of the judicial branch: independence and impartiality. It is not only
critical that the courts are impartial and independent, it is also important
that the courts appear to be both.
A court rule requiring key executive branch personnel to provide their
tax and investment records will shape how the President, through the solici-
tor general and other applicable government counsel, seeks to influence the
judiciary by creating an ethics based transparency rule. That is, under the
proposed ruleset, the executive branch can decide to forfeit a privilege of
practice that it has enjoyed for over a century and a half, or it can operate
on a level playing field.
As earlier noted, such a rule would apply to all future presidencies. In
the event that there is an appearance that a president or the other key indi-
231. See, e.g., George K. Yin, Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax
Returns, 154 TAXNOTES 1013 (2017).
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viduals covered by such a rule will benefit from the outcome of a decision,
the Court (and the lesser judiciary) can at least then issue a disclaimer that
the enrichment did not calculate into the decision to accept the amicus brief.
It will also give the solicitor general a decision as to whether to file the
amicus brief in the first place. A new SCR followed by an FRAP analog
rule will not only increase the public confidence in the judiciary, it will also
strengthen the judiciary itself. Such rules are not radical. Rather, these sug-
gested rules would be a progressive part of an evolutionary process that
began a century ago.
